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I. INTRODUCTION1
The operative basis of the criminal justice system in the
United States today is that a substantial number of people
charged with crimes will resolve those charges by entering guilty
pleas and forgoing their right to trial. While plea bargaining is
generally accepted as a necessary component of a wellfunctioning justice system, an inevitable and hidden cost is that
it can lead to innocent individuals pleading guilty to crimes they
did not commit.2 The acceptance of plea bargaining is based on
1 The Task Force wants to thank Morrison & Foerster LLP for hosting all
of the Focus Group and Steering Committee sessions and a plenary Task Force
meeting, and the New York County Lawyers’ Association (the “NYCLA”) for
hosting an all-day Forum of the entire Task Force. The Task Force also wants
to thank Tesser, Ryan & Rochman LLP, Colyn Eppes, Jackson Kerr, Randy
Tesser, and Omar Evans for working tirelessly to conduct meetings,
facilitating consensus, coordinating the preparation of this Report, and for
keeping their heads and our heads level while immersed in this serious and
compelling problem. Finally, the Task Force would like to acknowledge the
efforts of the Honorable Judge Rakoff in bringing light to the issue of innocent
people pleading guilty.
2 Criminologists who have studied this phenomenon of innocent people
pleading guilty “estimate that the overall rate for convicted felons as a whole
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there being the semblance of an actual bargain struck by
relatively equally situated and informed parties. But all too
often this is a fiction. When an innocent person is pressured to
plead guilty, it undermines our fundamental expectation that
criminal court procedure must lead to fair and just results. If
pressures leading to not truly bargained for pleas become
endemic in the criminal justice system, they undermine the
integrity and reliability of the system for all of us and breed
disrespect for the courts, prosecutors, and the rule of law.
The Plea Bargaining Task Force of the NYCLA Justice
Center (“Task Force”) formed in 2018 at the suggestion of the
chairs and under the auspices of the NYCLA Justice Center. As
part of its mission to combine NYCLA’s resources with other
segments of the bench, bar, and community groups, the Task
Force was asked to “identify and understand legal and social
justice issues, promote access to justice, and act as a catalyst for
meaningful improvement in, and a positive perception of, the
administration of justice in New York State.” The Task Force
was also asked to investigate whether and why innocent people
plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, to recommend
practical and achievable steps to reduce the incidence of such
pleas, and to improve both the implementation and public
perception of fairness regarding the plea-bargaining process.
Lew Tesser and Chet Kerr generously agreed to spearhead the
project and, with the assistance of both the Justice Center and a
steering committee, assembled a seventy-member task force
consisting of experts with substantial experience and varied
perspectives pertaining to the criminal justice system in the
federal and state courts in New York City. After a year of study,
discussion and analysis, the Task Force has identified several
factors that can powerfully influence an innocent person’s
decision to plead guilty. These are related to: inter alia, (1)
systemic pressure for speed and efficiency of case processing, (2)
the burden of repeated court appearances placed on the accused,
and (3) unduly harsh sentences imposed on felony offenders who
exercise their right to trial.
Accused misdemeanants and felony offenders often plead
guilty simply to “get the matter over with.” Many make that
is between two percent and eight percent.” Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People
Plead Guilty, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 20, 2014, at 7–8.
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choice because they cannot bear the costs of repeated court
appearances, including lost work and necessary childcare
expenses. Others make the choice without knowing how the plea
might seriously prejudice their housing and employment
opportunities. For defendants accused of serious crimes, fear of
a significantly longer jail or prison sentence after trial—
compared with the state’s offer of a much lower sentence in
return for a guilty plea—can motivate even an innocent person
to plead guilty quickly. Finally, the enormous number of lowlevel offenses charged and prosecuted in our lower courts
disproportionately affects our most vulnerable populations,
including the impoverished and people of color, resulting in a
staggering number of people pleading guilty and being
sentenced to undeserved and often harsh jail time or fines.
To address these negative factors inherent to the criminal
justice system, the Task Force has developed a set of proposals
and recommendations that it believes will reduce their influence
on the plea-bargaining system in New York, thereby potentially
reducing the number of innocent individuals who feel pressured
or compelled to enter guilty pleas. These proposals include:
Creating systems to reduce unnecessary court
appearances;
Developing ways to help defendants to become
more knowledgeable decision-makers;
Restoring judicial discretion with respect to
sentencing outcomes
and
not
penalizing
defendants for rejecting a plea offer
and
proceeding to trial; and
Increasing the decriminalization of low-level
offenses and employing sensible strategies to
manage the criminal process more effectively,
acknowledging that administrative efficiency is
not and should not be the determining factor in
plea bargaining discussions.
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A. The Existence and Prevalence of the Problem
Jury trials and an independent judiciary have long been
recognized and celebrated as both a means to determine guilt or
innocence and as a check on arbitrary government power. 3 The
reality today, however, is that few criminal defendants are tried
by a jury of their peers. Negotiated plea bargain agreements
account for well over ninety percent of criminal dispositions—
with less than three percent of cases proceeding to trial—in both
federal courts nationwide and in the New York State Courts.4 A
principal reason for this wide use of plea bargaining is that, in
the majority of cases, a negotiated plea agreement is seen as
mutually beneficial for both an accused criminal defendant and
the government. The ability of prosecutors to offer, and a
defendant to accept, a reduced charge and/or a shorter sentence
in exchange for a plea of guilty satisfies several interests: (1) the
defendant’s interest in obtaining the lowest sentence possible
without facing the risk of trial; (2) the prosecutor’s interest in
serving justice while conserving the resources of its office; and
(3) the interest of the judicial system of achieving efficient
resolutions of a large number of cases.5
Exoneration data, scholarly estimates, and anecdotal
3
See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, Ph.D., The Innocent
Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s
Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7-15 (2013).
4 John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial,
and Most who Do are Found Guilty, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminaldefendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ (based on research
collected by the federal judiciary and the National Center for State Courts);
John Gramlich, Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall to Lowest Level in Nearly
Two
Decades,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(Mar.
28,
2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/28/federal-criminalprosecutions-fall-to-lowest-level-in-nearly-two-decades/; Nat’l Ctr. for State
Courts, 2017 Gen. Jurisdiction Criminal Jury Trials and Rates, New York,
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx (follow
“Criminal” hyperlink; then follow “2018” hyperlink under “Select the Data
Year”; then follow “Gen. Jurisdiction Criminal Jury Trials and Rates”
hyperlink under “Select Chart/Table”; then follow “New York” hyperlink under
“Select State(s)”) (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
5 See generally, F. Andrew Hessick III, Plea Bargaining and Convicting
the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge,
16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189 (2002).
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evidence suggest, however, that there is a subset of criminal
defendants who chose to plead guilty to crimes that they did not
in fact commit.6 At the federal level, it is estimated that between
two and eight percent of convicted defendants plead guilty to
crimes for which they are factually innocent.7 While postconviction exoneration of defendants who have previously pled
guilty is some evidence of the phenomenon,8 the nature of
wrongful convictions, as well as the challenges of empirical
research, have made it difficult to quantify the number of
instances where someone who is factually innocent has entered
a guilty plea.9 Nevertheless, the available sources cited herein
all point to the same conclusion: that there are individual
defendants who are pleading guilty notwithstanding their
factual innocence and, thereafter, suffer unjustly the
consequences of a criminal conviction.10 It is the position of the
Justice Center and this Task Force that efforts must be made to
reduce the incidence of innocent people pleading guilty.
B. Why do Innocent People Plead Guilty?
There are a variety of reasons that an innocent person might
voluntarily enter a plea of guilty rather than seek vindication
through a public trial.11 Notably, there are various institutional
6
People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 525-6 (N.Y. 2018) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). The Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged the phenomenon
of innocent people pleading guilty and has upheld the practice of a defendant
entering a guilty plea while maintaining their innocence. See North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
7
See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 7-8; Daniel Givelber, Meaningless
Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliability Acquit the Innocent, 49
RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1343-44 (1997); cf. People v. Serrano, 206 N.E.2d 330
(N.Y. 1965).
8
See Exonerations in 2017, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Mar. 14,
2018),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ExonerationsIn20
17.pdf.
9 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 7-8.
10
John H. Blume & Rebecca J. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually
Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 172-80
(2014); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1117, 111721 (2008); Givelber, supra note 7, at 1318-1320.
11 Blume & Helm, supra note 10, at 172-80; see Tiger, 110 N.E.3d at 5267 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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forces that might prompt this act. These forces typically operate
disproportionately on misdemeanor defendants as processrelated costs that they cannot bear, and for felony defendants,
the threat of significantly longer sentences of incarceration for
those who exercise their right to trial and are convicted.
Even if a defendant believes that acquittal after trial is
likely, trials can be long, difficult, and disruptive.12 Defendants
may desire to spare themselves and their families the often
excessively high expense and emotional cost associated with
going to trial. Entering a plea of guilty might well be seen as
more acceptable than facing the exhaustive trial process, which
can require missing work and having to make child care or elder
care arrangements on short notice. Because the plea-bargaining
process (and other pre-trial procedures) can be arduous and
anxiety-inducing, some defendants may choose to plead guilty
merely to put an end to their present situation, particularly if
they are in jail pending a trial or other resolution.13
Prosecutors often have broad discretion in making charging
decisions, including the ability to threaten more severe charges
if a defendant declines a plea offer.14 In fact, post-trial sentences
tend to be significantly higher than sentences offered in plea
negotiations.15
Because of mandatory minimum sentence
statutes, a prosecutor’s charging decisions can often dictate the
resulting sentence after trial. Some defendants may choose to
accept a plea deal that carries a predictable outcome, rather
than risk (even the unlikely chance) of a disproportionately more
severe outcome after trial. Some defendants may also choose to
plead guilty to become eligible for beneficial programs, such as
diversionary programs, for which they must be found guilty to
be admitted.16
Criminal defendants may also be unfamiliar with the
criminal justice system and not fully understand that defense
12
N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., PETIT JUROR’S HANDBOOK 10 (2015),
https://www.nyjuror.gov/pdfs/hb_Petit.pdf (“The average length of a criminal
trial is five to ten days.”).
13 See, e.g., Blume & Helm, supra note 10, at 173-74.
14 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
15 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO
SAVE IT 6 (2018) [hereinafter NACDL REPORT].
16 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 216.05(4) (McKinney 2019).
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attorneys are on their side. As a result, defendants can feel
powerless in a complex, opaque system, and may decide that
entering a guilty plea, with its known and sometimes unknown
attendant consequences, is better than being caught in a
stressful situation about which they have little understanding
and over which they perceive they have little or no control.
Many defendants charged with crimes carrying short jail terms
or probationary sentences do not always realize the future
implications for housing and employment opportunities and will
plead guilty to achieve what they perceive to be an
inconsequential sentence.
C. Recent, Relevant Criminal Justice Reform Efforts
1. Bar Reports
Several bar associations and other institutions have
recently published reports focused on addressing flaws within
our criminal justice system, including the plea-bargaining
process. The Task Force has reviewed and relied upon the
following reports, which have been helpful in understanding the
specific issues addressed in this Report.
In 2018, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (“NACDL”) issued a report discussing the phenomenon
of the “trial penalty,” i.e., the “discrepancy between the sentence
the prosecutor is willing to offer in exchange for a guilty plea and
the sentence that would be imposed after a trial” if the defendant
is convicted in federal courts.17 Based on its findings, the
NACDL set out ten principles intended to guide ten specific
recommendations for addressing this problem, some of which
were particularly important to the Task Force’s work of
identifying proposals to lessen the likelihood of innocent people
pleading guilty.18 The principles related to the impact that the
trial penalty and plea bargaining practices had on the role of the
justice system.
In 2019, the New York State Bar Association’s second Task
Force on Wrongful Convictions (“TFWC”) published a report,
17
18

See NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 5-6.
Id. at 11-12.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/1

8

2020

SOLVING INNOCENTS PLEADING GUILTY

9

expanding on the findings of an earlier TFWC report from 2009,
which had identified six causes that were “primary factors
responsible for wrongful convictions.”19 These factors included:
identification procedures, mishandling of forensic evidence, use
of false confessions, errors by law enforcement (including
prosecutors), defense practices, and the use of jailhouse
informants.20 After reviewing recent data and developments
over the past decade, the 2019 TFWC Report advocates that:
each District Attorney’s Office in the State of New
York establish a Conviction Integrity Unit
(“CIU”), or, where not feasible, create a program
for conviction review;21 and
the New York Legislature add a new subsection
(h) to section 440.10 of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law that would permit a newly
discovered evidence claim after a guilty plea.22
2. Prosecutorial Reform
In 2019, Kings County District Attorney Eric Gonzalez
published an action plan for his office with the intention that it
serve as a “national model of what a progressive prosecutor’s
office can be.”23 The action plan may well have the effect of
19 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, REPORT
OF TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 5 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 TFWC
REPORT]. See generally N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK
FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2009).

2019 TFWC REPORT, supra note 19, at 5.
Id. at 6.
22 Id. at 10. In People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 514-17 (N.Y. 2018), the
New York Court of Appeals held that a motion to vacate a judgment of guilty
in a criminal proceeding based on newly discovered evidence is not available
where the defendant has voluntarily entered a plea of guilty. Id. at 99-102 n.7.
23 ERIC GONZALEZ, BROOKLYN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, JUSTICE 2020 at 9
(2019),
http://brooklynda.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Justice2020Report.pdf. District Attorney Gonzalez’s plan aims to take a targeted approach
in dealing with crime in Kings County, focusing resources on “identifying and
removing from the community those who cause the most harm . . . while
diverting out of the criminal justice system or into community-based services
those who don’t pose a threat to public safety.” Id. at 8. In order to achieve
those goals, the Kings County action plan focused on four main areas: 1)
20
21
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reducing the amount of innocent people pleading guilty through,
inter alia, expanded diversionary programs and exploring new
alternatives to incarceration.
3. Recent Legislative Amendments to the Criminal Justice
System in New York
In April 2019, the New York State Legislature passed
comprehensive reforms to its Criminal Procedure Law, which
took effect in January 2020 (the “2019 NY Criminal Justice
Reform Legislation”). These reforms focus on changes to the bail
system, criminal discovery and speedy trial requirements under
New York law. The Task Force studied these legislative changes
and considered how they might potentially affect innocent
individuals pleading guilty. In particular, the Task Force has
considered how a lengthy pre-trial detention and a lack of access
to discoverable information in the early stages of a case can have
a coercive impact on an innocent defendant’s decision whether
to plead guilty.24
First, the new legislation eliminates cash bail for all
misdemeanors and class E felonies (the lowest level of felony
offense), with some minor exceptions. Instead, police officers are
required to serve desk appearance tickets, allowing individuals
to remain at liberty pending the resolution of their cases.25 This
bold reform aims to decrease the disruption in individuals’ lives
when they have been arrested and accused of committing lowlevel offenses. Instead of spending a night, multiple nights, or
months in jail because they cannot afford to post bail, people will
attend their jobs, take care of their families, and otherwise live
their normal lives as they await court dates. The new bail
legislation also incentivizes judges to release individuals under
non-monetary conditions rather than holding them in pre-trial
reducing incarceration by making jail the “alternative”; 2) engaging
communities as partners in justice; 3) focusing resources on the drivers of
crime; and 4) transforming and educating the internal culture of the DA’s
office. Id. at 12-13.
24 See Blume & Helm, supra note 10, at 173-74, 183; Hessick III, supra
note 5, at 211-15; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics,
and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full
Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 307-09 (2008).
25 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10 (McKinney 2019).
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detention, unless a court determines an individual to be a flight
risk.26 The new legislation is expected to decrease the number
of individuals who are being held in pre-trial detention.
Second, the new discovery statute calls for open discovery in
all criminal cases and further requires prosecutors to turn over
their discovery to defendants within fifteen days of a defendant’s
arraignment.27 More transparent discovery practices ensure
that defendants are better informed about the facts of their cases
as they weigh the decision of whether to plead guilty or take
their case to trial. In particular, the new discovery legislation
assures that defendants will have access to the prosecution’s
discoverable material before accepting a plea offer. 28 This will
help close the information gap between prosecutors and
defendants, which previously led some defendants to feel coerced
into accepting a plea deal without an understanding of the
government’s case.
Third, the changes to speedy trial requirements provide
that, when the prosecution informs the court that they are ready
for trial, they must sign a certificate of compliance that the new
discovery requirements have been met, and the defendant will
have a chance to object on the record if this is not the case.29
Moreover, if the prosecution notifies the court that they are
ready to proceed with trial, but subsequently requests more
time, the court will approve the request only upon “a showing of
sufficient supporting facts.” This legislative change is likely to
shorten the pre-trial detention period for many defendants.
These reforms are relevant to the problem of innocent
Id. § 510.10(1).
The breadth of this initial discovery obligations includes, inter alia, all
Rosario material, grand jury testimony of the victim and the defendant, names
and contact information of witnesses (with certain exceptions), police reports,
search warrants and accompanying affidavits in support of the warrants,
electronically stored information, and criminal conviction records of both the
defendant and prosecution witnesses. See id. § 245.10.
28 When a defendant is charged with a felony, and the prosecution makes
a pre-indictment plea offer to a crime, the prosecutor must disclose all
discoverable items not less than three calendar days prior to the expiration
date of any plea offer or any deadline imposed by the court for acceptance of
the plea offer. Id. § 245.25(1). When a defendant is charged with a
misdemeanor and the prosecution makes a pre-indictment plea offer, the
prosecution must disclose its discoverable material within seven calendar days
of the expiration of the plea offer. Id. § 245.25(2).
29 Id. § 30.30(5).
26
27
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people pleading guilty, and it is expected that, if fully and
effectively implemented, they will serve to moderate some of the
coercive aspects of plea bargaining. Taken together, these
studies, policy initiatives, and recently-passed laws indicate that
justice professionals are open to taking a fresh look at the issue
of plea bargaining compelling innocent people to plead guilty.
II.NYCLA’S JUSTICE CENTER TASK FORCE30
A. Mission & Composition of Task Force
The mission of the Task Force is to research and evaluate
the issue of innocent people pleading guilty and to identify some
practical and achievable solutions to prevent this phenomenon
from happening. In order to efficiently utilize the resources of
the Task Force, we focused our research primarily on the
processes, procedures, and rules applicable to the Federal and
State courts in the New York City Metropolitan
area. Nevertheless, the Task Force hopes that the proposals,
individually and collectively, will serve as a model for New York
State, other states, and the federal government for reducing the
occurrence of this disturbing phenomenon. Additionally, the
problem of innocent people pleading guilty extends to both
felonies and misdemeanors. Accordingly, both levels of offenses
were studied and proposals are made that have applicability to
both felonies and misdemeanors.
The Task Force was composed of approximately 70
members, including former appellate court and criminal court
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, law school professors and
other leaders of the bar. In the rare circumstance in which
general consensus was not manifest, it is noted in this Report.
The Roster of the Task Force is shown in Appendix A.
B. The Task Force Process
The Justice Center created the Task Force in late 2018. The
30
The views set forth in this report do not necessarily reflect the
individual views of all members of the Task Force or of any organization with
which they are associated.
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Task Force quickly identified and collected a wide range of law
review articles, bar reports and case law addressing the issue of
plea bargaining, and made that research available to all Task
Force Members. The Task Force held its first plenary meeting
on January 22, 2019, to discuss its mandate and the process it
would use to evaluate the issue of innocent defendants pleading
guilty and to identify proposals to address this issue. The
Honorable Jed S. Rakoff delivered the keynote address.
The Task Force conducted an exhaustive review of the
history of plea bargaining and determined that it would be
neither advisable nor practicable to endorse a wholesale
overhaul of the plea bargaining system, which the Supreme
Court has described as “not only an essential part of the
[criminal justice] process, but a highly desirable part for many
reasons.”31 During the spring of 2019, the Task Force held a
series of focus groups where Task Force members considered a
wide range of substantive and procedural issues that arise over
the duration of a criminal proceeding. The operating theory was
that discussions by knowledgeable people with on-the-ground
experience, looking at the various stages of the criminal and
plea-bargaining process, might expose opportunities for
corrective action that would not endanger public safety. Each of
the six focus group meetings was open to the entire Task Force.
Nearly the entire Task Force participated in one or more of the
focus groups.
The focus group discussions examined how each of these
issues impacted defendants, defense counsel, prosecutors, and
judges as a case moved through the system and how that, in
turn, could potentially motivate—or pressure—innocent people
to plead guilty. Based on these discussions, participants in the
focus groups identified potential reforms.
In the initial stages of the focus group discussions, the Task
Force determined that the topics of bail, criminal discovery, and
speedy trial were areas of possible concern, in part because the
then current system was perceived as unduly burdensome on
31 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). For more information
on the history of plea bargaining, see generally Albert Alschuler, Plea
Bargaining and its History, 79 COL. L. REV. 1 (Jan. 1979), and Special Issue on
Plea Bargaining – Historical Perspectives, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 189, 211-285
(1979).
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defendants, thus adding pressure on defendants to plead guilty.
However, after the 2019 New York Criminal Justice Reform
Legislation passed, the Task Force decided that it would be more
effective to support and supplement the efforts of the New York
legislature, rather than propose entirely new initiatives in these
areas. The Task Force discussed potential challenges that
defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges might face in adapting
to the new legislative framework, and whether there were any
initiatives that it could undertake to ease this transition
consistent with the goal of reducing the incidence of innocent
people pleading guilty.
C. Topics Studied by the Focus Groups
1. Charging
The Task Force considered the role of prosecutorial
discretion in our justice system, including balancing the
presumption of innocence, managing prosecutorial resources,
the values of an adversarial justice system, and the role of grand
juries in moderating prosecutorial discretion. The Task Force
also discussed unintended consequences that have stemmed
from the current state of prosecutorial discretion, such as public
perceptions of incongruent leverage between prosecutors and
defendants, the ability to charge multiple degrees of the same
offense and multiple offenses based on the same conduct, and
reliance on police reporting which might not be sufficiently
confirmed.
2. Role of Defense Counsel
The Task Force considered the role of defense counsel within
the criminal justice system and how the limits of that role might
contribute to the phenomenon of innocent people pleading
guilty. Topics explored included how and when defense counsels
communicate with their clients, how the plea-bargaining process
is affected by the mistrust of prosecutors among defense counsel,
the lack of funding for defense counsel, and the impact of delay
tactics by both prosecutors and defense counsel during pretrial
proceedings. Additionally, the Task Force discussed time
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pressures in the plea-bargaining process and the way defense
counsels’ limited access to their clients often resulted in
insufficient time to speak with them about their cases.
3. Judicial Involvement in the Plea-Bargaining Process
The Task Force considered the differing approaches to
judicial participation in the plea-bargaining process in the New
York state courts and in federal court. The Task Force examined
how judicial involvement in the plea-bargaining process could
risk influencing the defendant’s plea, learning confidential
information, and giving the appearance of being a biased party.
The Task Force also considered whether judicial involvement in
plea bargaining would allow judges to ensure that defendants
are informed, acting as a check on misconduct and the imbalance
of power between litigants, and increasing perceptions of
fairness.
4. Sentencing
The Task Force examined the history and intent of
mandatory minimum sentence statutes and sentencing
guidelines at both the State and Federal levels. The Task Force
discussed the positive effects of these statutes and guidelines,
such as deterrence from committing crimes, and the potentially
problematic effects, such as widening the gap between pre-trial
and post-sentences, which some argue can coerce defendants to
plead guilty.

D. Developing and Selecting Potential Solutions
Guided by its research and the focus group process, the Task
Force initially identified over one hundred proposals that, if
implemented, could potentially reduce the number of innocent
people who plead guilty. These proposals were circulated to, and
ranked by, the members of the Task Force. In evaluating which
proposals to potentially adopt, the Task Force considered both
the likelihood and extent to which such proposals would reduce
the incidence of innocent people pleading guilty, as well as the
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feasibility of implementing such proposals. The twelve highest
ranked proposals were then discussed and debated at the Task
Force’s second plenary session on May 9, 2019. Following these
extensive deliberations, the Task Force voted on which proposals
were most likely to effect positive change for innocent
defendants (as well as the criminal justice system at large) and
could be realistically implemented.32 The recommendations in
this Report and the following declaration are the result of this
multistage process.
III. DECLARATION THAT EFFICIENCY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE A DETERMINATIVE
FACTOR FOR MAKING PLEA BARGAINING DECISIONS
A common foundational principle cutting across all points of
concern the Task Force identified is that procedural efficiency
should not produce unjust outcomes. Throughout the focus
group meetings, there was a recurring discussion about the role
of “efficiency” in the criminal justice system and whether it
provides a justification for current plea-bargaining practices.
The Task Force recognized that the drive for efficiency in the
criminal justice system —and an attendant pressure to plea
bargain—can sometimes reflect and be driven by powerful
institutional pressures to reduce costs and preserve resources.
This ongoing dialogue set the stage for the generation of a
number of proposals, some of which were ultimately adopted in
this Report.
The Task Force has determined that the current pleabargaining system as it operates in New York effectively
incentivizes criminal defendants to plead guilty, forfeiting their
constitutional rights to avoid the time, risk, and cost of a trial by
jury. While plea bargaining is an important, and arguably
necessary, component of this country’s criminal justice system,
the Task Force believes that encouraging defendants to plead
32 The Task Force decided that any proposals enacted in this Report must
be generally endorsable by all of the various stakeholders in the criminal
justice system—prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, academics, and policy
advocates—all of whom are represented on the Task Force. Drafts of the report
were also shared with knowledgeable people from groups outside the Justice
Center.
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guilty cannot and should not be justified by institutional
pressure from judges, prosecutors and/or defense counsel to
preserve financial resources and avoid the necessary costs of a
fair system of justice. Administrative efficiency and cost savings
are worthy goals, but protecting the bedrock constitutional
values at play in the operation of a legitimate criminal justice
system must be paramount. To preserve these important values,
it is essential that administrative efficiency must not be a
determinative factor for making plea bargaining decisions.
The fundamental Constitutional rights afforded to any
person charged with a crime—the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right to
confront one’s accusers—are essential to protect individuals
from arbitrary governmental power, and serve to safeguard and
validate the basic assumption that all defendants are innocent
until proven guilty. Entering a plea of guilty necessarily
requires a defendant to waive these rights and accept the finality
of a criminal conviction.
The Task Force recognizes that, in appropriate cases, a plea
of guilty can serve both a defendant’s needs and society’s
interests in a fair, just, and efficiently run criminal justice
system. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has
long affirmed that a system that allows for guilty pleas—and
that requires defendants who are charged with a crime to waive
fundamental Constitutional rights—has many benefits for both
defendants and society as a whole.33
Speed and the administrative efficacy of moving individuals
charged with crimes quickly through the justice system,
motivated by an interest in attendant cost savings, cannot alone
justify the cost of waiving constitutional protections. The
Supreme Court has made clear that “while justice should be
administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly
expedition and not mere speed.” 34 Thus, the Court has
emphasized the importance of defendants having a full and fair
opportunity to assert their procedural and substantive rights,
even if that slows down the criminal process.

33
34

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970).
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1950).
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[I]n large measure because of the many
procedural safeguards provided an accused, the
ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution are
designed to move at a deliberate pace. A
requirement of unreasonable speed would have a
deleterious effect both upon the rights of the
accused and upon the ability of society to protect
itself.35
This balance can be severely tested by institutional and
cost-saving pressures to process defendants quickly through the
criminal justice system by relying on plea bargaining to resolve
the vast majority of criminal cases. There are statutory and
institutional incentives for persons charged with a crime not
only to plead guilty, but also to enter a plea early in the process
even if the defendant may not yet have a full understanding of
the factual basis of the charges they face. This is especially true
when local governments, judges and prosecutors are faced with
financial pressures to allocate limited resources to address a
large number of criminal defendants, many of whom are poor
and cannot afford criminal representation of their own. As noted
above, the institutional pressures to reduce costs and protect
“scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources” is actually cited as
a basis for justifying the use of guilty pleas instead of allowing
full criminal trials.36 In the federal system, criminal defendants
can receive a reduction in sentence by agreeing to plead guilty
early in the process “thereby permitting the government to avoid
preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its
resources efficiently.”37
35 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (emphasis added); see
Darryl K. Brown, Essay: The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process,
100 VA. L. REV. 183 (2014).
36 Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
37
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E.1.1(b) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). This guideline, which allows for a downward
adjustment in the initial calculation of a possible criminal sentence, falls
within the adjustment factor known as “Acceptance of Responsibility.” As
made clear in the Commentary Notes, “[t]he timeliness of the defendant’s
acceptance of responsibility is a consideration under both subsections [a and
b]” of this adjustment factor. Id. § 3E.1.1 cmt. n. 6. See generally Margareth
Etienne, Acceptance of Responsibility and Plea Bargaining Under the Feeney
Amendment, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 109 (2003).
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When defendants feel pressured to barter their
constitutional rights in order to save administrative costs, the
system unavoidably breeds cynicism. The Task Force recognizes
that the added pressures to process defendants quickly can be
especially acute for those charged individuals who are factually
innocent and are presented with plea deals seemingly endorsed
by judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, all of whom have an
interest in keeping the system moving. There are inherent,
conflicting pressures faced by anyone charged with a crime when
considering whether to plead guilty, but impelling individuals
who may not have committed a crime to nevertheless plead
guilty to meet the goals of saving money and administrative
efficiency is an especially insidious attack on constitutional
protections that serve us all.
Thus, the Task Force believes that pursuing
“administrative efficiency” in our system of plea bargaining—
focusing solely on the expeditious processing of defendants
through the criminal justice system for the purpose of saving
money and resources—should not be and cannot be the driver of
a fair criminal system. Plea bargaining is, and will likely
remain, a key part of our justice system, but its ongoing validity
necessarily depends upon the ability of individuals charged with
a crime to assert their rights secured by the Constitution
without penalty. Accordingly, when evaluating how to improve
our plea-bargaining system to reduce the number of innocent
individuals who plead guilty—as well as protect all defendants
charged with a crime—the safeguarding of every individual’s
ability to assert and exercise their rights must be paramount.
Emphasizing the importance of allowing all defendants to
freely choose to assert these constitutional rights—even
defendants who choose to plead guilty—is consistent with, if not
required by, the Constitution.
The establishment of prompt efficacious
procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in
constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill
of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause
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in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy
that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones.38
These important values of promoting the exercise of
Constitutional rights by criminal defendants over the need to
process them quickly through a criminal system primarily made
up of plea bargaining remain as important today as they did fifty
years ago. Justice Gorsuch recently made this point forcefully
in a case dealing with whether or not a defendant was entitled
to a jury trial before he could be sentenced to the maximum
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release.
Jury trials are inconvenient for the government.
Yet like much else in our Constitution, the jury
system isn’t designed to promote efficiency but to
protect liberty. . . . This Court has repeatedly
sought to guard the historic role of the jury
against such incursions. For “however convenient
these may appear at first, (as doubtless all
arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most
convenient) yet let it be again remembered, that
delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of
justice, are the price that all free nations must pay
for their liberty in more substantial matters.”39
For all these reasons, the Task Force believes that cost
savings in the operation of the criminal justice system should
not be found through rewarding guilty pleas or by punishing
defendants who decline to sacrifice their constitutional rights.
The system should look elsewhere to find savings.
38 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); accord Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 690 (1973).
39 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2384 (2019) (quoting 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 298, 344 (1769)).
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IV. TASK FORCE PROPOSALS
A. Proposal No. 1: Reduce Unnecessary Appearances by
Defendants
The Task Force determined that many participants in the
criminal justice process—prosecutors, defense counsel and
judges—believe that repeated court appearances by defendants,
whether they are at liberty or are incarcerated, impose added
and undue pressure. This may result in some number of
individuals pleading guilty just to end the process, including
those defendants who are in fact innocent.
The need to attend repeated court appearances can be
extremely disruptive to a defendant’s everyday life. For those
defendants who are not being held pre-trial, they are often
compelled to disrupt their daily routine to appear for court
appearances. If the defendant has a job, they may need to take
a day off from work or, if that is not possible, get coverage from
a co-worker or risk being fired. They might need to reveal to
their employer or co-worker that they had been charged with a
crime, a serious privacy concern. Even if a defendant has
permission to take time off and go to court for a court
appearance, scheduling changes are constant in the New York
court system, and many defendants may end up having to come
back to court repeatedly. To meet these scheduling demands, a
defendant may need to cancel appointments, arrange and pay
for childcare or elder care, and deal with many other disruptions
to their everyday routine. This can be extremely burdensome,
especially if a defendant needs to appear in court four, five, or
even ten times during the disposition of their case, which often
may result in the loss of employment.
Even when a defendant is being held in pre-trial detention,
attending multiple court days can be extremely stressful,
especially for a defendant who is factually innocent. A defendant
will be awakened very early in the morning for transport and be
required to travel a significant distance to get to the courthouse
where they will sit in a holding cell until their case is called. The
defendant may have limited access to food and water while they
are waiting for their case to be heard. Some defendants will wait
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in the holding cell in the courthouse all day only to learn that
they will be traveling back to the jailhouse and doing it over
again the following day because their case was not called.
The Task Force found that these lengthy and often
unnecessary court appearances can be extremely disruptive and
impose substantial pressure on a defendant during the pretrial
process. The Task Force further found that the need to make
repeated appearances, with the resulting substantial
disruptions in a defendant’s everyday life, imposes substantial
pressure on defendants to terminate the proceedings by pleading
guilty. The Task Force believes that reducing the need for these
appearances can potentially relieve some of this pressure and,
thus, make it less likely that individuals who are innocent will
nonetheless feel they have no choice but to plead guilty.
The Task Force proposes that an accused defendant should
not be required to attend any hearing or court appearance where
there will be no substantive determination of the merits or case
disposition, and/or where there will be no impact on the
defendant’s substantive constitutional rights, unless the court
specifically directs the defendant to be present. Thus, the
defendant will not need to be present for mere ministerial or
scheduling hearings that will not impact the ultimate
disposition of his or her case.
The Task Force further proposes that an accused person,
with no criminal history, no previous warrants, or an overall
history of regularly attending court proceedings should be
deemed presumptively excused from certain court proceedings.
An “eligible” court proceeding is one at which there is no realistic
possibility of case disposition or of any proceedings regarding the
merits of the case, or where the input, participation, or presence
of the accused is unnecessary. Additionally, an accused person
with employment, educational, family care responsibilities, or
other life situations that make repeated court appearances
difficult or impossible could be excused whenever possible.
1. Implementation Considerations
All decisions regarding excusal of an accused shall be made
by the court, on application of defense counsel, giving the
prosecutor an opportunity to be heard. Those applications shall
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be made on the record with respect to each prospective court
adjourn date, and with the appropriate notations made on the
court file. Counsel should confer in advance of the call of the
case, to discuss whether the presence of the accused will be
necessary on the next adjourn date.
In the event an accused advises court personnel that an
unexpected pressing commitment has arisen, the court should
endeavor to cooperate with the accused so that their
commitment can be accommodated, to the extent possible. If the
accused’s presence is determined to be necessary, the court
should explain why an accommodation is not possible and
attempt to fashion some alternate solution.
When the court has granted defense counsel’s application to
excuse the accused from appearing on the next court date, court
personnel should provide the accused with written notice
indicating that the defendant’s presence is excused and contact
information for the courtroom where the case will next appear.
The notice should advise that any intentional failure to appear
at future court dates may result in the issuance of a bench
warrant. Additionally, courts should be encouraged to give
Parker warnings,40 orally and in writing, at the first
adjournment and defendants should be promptly notified of
what occurred when they were not present.
Incarcerated accused persons may be permitted to waive
their appearance in court, at future “eligible” court proceedings,
by waiving their right to appear on the record during the
preceding court date. As video technology advances and becomes
more generally available in courtrooms, courts can explore its
use as a way to facilitate appearances, for both defendants who
are incarcerated and for defendants who are not incarcerated
pretrial.41
40
See People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 1314-16 (N.Y.1982) (holding,
inter alia, that where a defendant has actual notice of a trial date and
voluntarily fails to appear, that defendant has not therefore implicitly
relinquished their right to be present at trial); see N.Y. State Unified Court
Sys.,
Parker
Warning,
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/8Colloquies/Admonition-Parker.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). A Parker
warning is an affirmative notice to a defendant that they have a right to be
present in court and that they can, by their conduct, waive, forfeit, or lose that
right. See id.
41 See infra part IV(B)(1). As discussed infra, video conferencing should
not be used as a wholesale substitute for in-person meetings between attorneys
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Implementation of these proposals, with the exception of
those requiring increased personnel and financial support, will
likely not require additional statutory authority or modification
of court rules. Rather, whether it occurs on a court-by-court or
county-by-county basis, individual defense counsel can make
applications to have their clients excused or placed on telephone
alert. The Task Force hopes that, by highlighting the problems
that can arise from requiring repeated appearances by
defendants, prosecutors, defense counsel and the courts will be
increasingly receptive to excusing accused individuals from
appearing when appearance is unnecessary.

B. Proposal No. 2: Facilitate Pre-Trial Communication
between Incarcerated Clients and Defense Counsel
At the heart of the attorney-client relationship lies attorneyclient communication, and the trust between an attorney and
their client. Effective communication is a vital method for the
mutual transmission of information, the building of a
relationship of trust, and the development of strategy by defense
counsel and client. To be effective, it requires, among other
things, sufficient privacy and adequate time.
Despite the importance of effective attorney-client
communication, significant factors can impede the ability to
communicate, especially for clients who are in custody pretrial.
If attorney-client communication only consists of a few rushed
minutes near the courtroom when an incarcerated client is
brought for an appearance, the rare visit at a correctional
facility, or the occasional phone call, it is much more difficult to
build a relationship of trust between a defendant and defense
counsel.
The Task Force found that ineffective communication can
lead to frustration and distrust of the criminal justice system by
defendants and impose added pressure on innocent defendants
when presented with a proposed plea agreement. Many
defendants do not have a sophisticated understanding of the
criminal justice process and, therefore, are reliant on their
and clients.
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counsel to advise them as their case proceeds. Moreover,
defendants may not understand why their case seems not to be
progressing even though they have been to court multiple times.
Ensuring effective communication with counsel allows
defendants to navigate the criminal justice process more
effectively and helps them to avoid making rash decisions, such
as pleading guilty to a crime they did not commit simply to end
the process.
For those in custody, the pressure to accept a guilty plea is
particularly significant, as a defendant may perceive,
incorrectly, that taking a plea offers the quickest prospect of
freedom. If defense counsel can effectively communicate with
their clients, they can counter this pressure in various ways,
such as educating their clients about the criminal justice
process, gaining information that will strengthen arguments for
taking a case to trial, making applicable pretrial motions,
discussing possible trial strategies, and offering support and
hope. Conversely, in those situations where it might be in a
client’s best interest to accept a plea deal rather than proceeding
with a case, the lack of adequate communication can frustrate
that outcome. In short, improved access to defense counsel will
grant more defendants the ability to confidently make informed
decisions about whether to plead guilty.
The Task Force specifically focused on those defendants who
are in the pre-adjudication custody of the New York City
Department of Correction (“DOC”) and the need to improve
communication between defense counsel and their clients at the
City’s correctional facilities.
1. Reform the Scheduling Procedure and Facility
Accommodations for In-Person Visits with Clients at
Correctional Facilities
One of the barriers to effective communication between
attorneys and their incarcerated clients is the amount of time
and difficulty it takes to visit clients at the City’s correctional
facilities, especially Rikers Island.42
Rikers Island is
42 The DOC’s facility at Rikers Island actually consists of ten separate
jail facilities, all of which must be accessed through the Benjamin Ward Visit
Center.
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inconveniently located, and the process for visiting with a
defendant in custody is highly inefficient and often involves
substantial wait times. Once through the initial security
checkpoint at Rikers, attorneys must wait for a bus to take them
to the specific facility where their client is held. After arriving
at that specific facility, attorneys must once again go through
security and can often wait for over an hour for a client to be
brought to the visiting area to have an in-person meeting.
The Task Force proposes that the DOC permit attorneys to
schedule in-person meetings at correctional facilities at specific,
designated times so that clients can be brought in advance and
attorneys are not required to endure long wait times.
The DOC is already using this type of scheduling process for
video conferencing, which has proven to be more effective at
ensuring that clients are in a certain place at a certain time.
Currently, if an attorney wants to meet with a client for a video
conference, a call is placed by the attorney’s office to the specific
facility where the client is being held to schedule the conference.
Video conferences are available weekdays between 9:00 a.m. and
4:30 p.m., generally in thirty-minute increments. After the
conference has been scheduled, the attorney’s office must email
a “production sheet” to the DOC with specific information about
the client, the attorney, and the conference. All of this must
happen by 3:30 p.m. the day before the scheduled conference.
At the date and time of the scheduled visit, the client is
brought to the video conference area of the facility in which they
are being held. The attorney calls that facility to confirm the
client is present, and then places a call to the Office of Court
Administration’s (“OCA”) Video Conference Unit, who connects
the attorney’s office to the booth the client has been placed in at
the facility for the meeting.
The Task Force proposes that this same type of advance
scheduling process be adopted for in-person meetings between
counsel and a defendant. The attorney’s office could call the
specific facility where their client is being held in advance to
schedule the meeting.43 The attorney’s office would then send a
43 The 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. scheduling limitations for video conferences
should not be applicable in this instance because those times are constrained
by the OCA Video Conference Unit’s working hours. Because the OCA does not
play any role in scheduling in-person meetings, the times could be extended.
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“production sheet” to the DOC with the required information by
3:30 p.m. the day before the scheduled meeting. It would then
be up to the attorney to arrive at Rikers Island thirty minutes
prior to the start of the scheduled meeting to allow them time to
clear security and arrive at the specific facility.
The Task Force anticipates that the DOC will express
concern that attorneys will fail to show up for meetings at the
scheduled time. As with video conferences, there should be a
cancellation window before the meeting is scheduled to start.
Attorneys who know that they will not be able to attend the
meeting due to unforeseen circumstances must call and cancel
by the determined cancellation time to ensure that clients are
not needlessly moved around the facility. Attorneys must also
make sure to schedule meetings only during times when they
are confident they will be available.44
This simple change in scheduling policy would save time
and greatly aid in facilitating communication between defense
attorneys and their incarcerated clients.
2. Create Remote Communication Procedures for Incarcerated
Clients
The Task Force believes that the value of in-person
meetings between incarcerated clients and defense counsel
cannot be overstated. Unlike other forms of communication, inperson meetings allow defense counsel to (1) present and explain
relevant documents to their client; (2) analyze the validity of the
client’s version of the factual nuances of the case; and (3) assess
their client’s physical and mental well-being. Moreover, inperson communication demonstrates to incarcerated clients that
they have an advocate in their corner who is fervently
advocating for their best interests.
The unfortunate reality, however, is that defense counsels,
and especially public defenders, have limited opportunities to
make personal visits to jails to discuss their clients’ cases. The
Task Force believes this problem can be remedied by making it

44 Scheduling a visit should not be required—an attorney could still show
up at their own convenience just as before and choose to wait for a client to be
brought to the visiting area at the correction facility.
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easier for defense counsel to communicate with their clients by
telephone.
The Task Force recommends that procedures be adopted by
the DOC and other institutions that would allow defense
counsels to contact their clients by telephone at specific
designated times. Facilities can set aside time for inmates to
receive calls from defense counsel at workable times, for
example, taking into account daily routines such as meals,
counts, and lockdowns. The Task Force also recommends that
counsel be able to schedule calls in the same way video
conferences are currently scheduled.
Remote communications also play a vital role in ensuring
adequate attorney-client communication. Incarcerated clients
must know that they have the ability to reach out and
communicate with their counsel. Making private remote
communications between counsel and their client more
accessible allows defense counsel to provide updates about the
status of their case, develop a rapport with their client, and
lessen the client’s feeling of despair and being “lost in the
system.” Remote communication also allows counsel with large
caseloads to regularly stay in contact with clients without
devoting significant portions of a day to make personal visits,
and should alleviate the frustration a client experiences when
he or she attempts to call counsel and is unable to reach them.
As video conference technology continues to develop, the
Task Force recommends that the DOC explore how to expand
the availability of video conferencing for defendants and their
counsel. This includes increasing the number of rooms available
for defendants to use for video conferences with their attorneys
and utilizing the DOC procedures already in place. 45 The Task
Force further recommends the expansion of the availability of
telephonic communications between attorneys and incarcerated
clients.
C. Proposal No. 3: Provide Defendants with Educational
Resources About the Criminal Justice System, Criminal
Procedure, and What to Expect as their Case Proceeds.

45

See supra part IV(B)(1).
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The vast majority of criminal defendants lack basic
knowledge of substantive or procedural criminal law. In
addition, despite the best efforts of defense counsel, many
defendants have only a limited understanding about what has
happened and what is likely to happen as their case progresses.
The Task Force is concerned that this lack of information may
prevent defendants from making well-informed decisions
regarding plea offers, which in turn heightens the risk that
innocent defendants may be pressured to enter a plea of
guilty. To address this problem, the Task Force recommends
that defendants be provided with easily accessible educational
resources about the criminal justice system and basic criminal
procedure, the status of their individual cases, and the collateral
consequences of taking a plea or being convicted of a crime.
Initially, it is important to understand the impact that a
defendant’s lack of understanding about the criminal law and
criminal process has on the decision-making process.
Individuals who find themselves caught in the machinery of the
criminal justice system—a complex and at times opaque
process—often have little or no training in the how the justice
system operates. Therefore, many defendants have only a basic
understanding of what to expect as they are pushed through the
process. Legal terminology can be difficult and confusing. There
are many procedural aspects of a criminal proceeding that only
an attorney or someone experienced in the legal system would
understand. Most criminal defendants cannot be expected to
understand the nature of motion practice, the various reasons
for numerous court hearings, the purpose behind the defense
attorney asking certain questions, or the explanation for why the
process can take such a long time. Additionally, most
defendants do not fully understand, let alone know about, the
collateral consequences of accepting a guilty plea, such as
prohibitions on obtaining housing and certain licenses, or the
effects
a
conviction
could
have
on
employment
opportunities. This lack of knowledge and understanding can
make it extremely challenging for defendants to fully appreciate
what is happening in their cases and to make reasoned and
thoughtful judgments about the risks of proceeding to trial or
accepting a plea offer.
When accepting any plea deal, criminal defendants are
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required to state on the record that their acceptance is knowing,
voluntary and that they understand the consequences of their
acceptance. In reality, however, many criminal defendants lack
a basic understanding of the consequences of accepting a plea
deal. This is true even after their attorneys have explained the
consequences to them.
The Task Force believes that criminal defendants’ lack of
understanding of the criminal justice system can significantly
and negatively impact their ability to consider and assess the
costs and benefits of entering a plea of guilty. More importantly,
this lack of understanding can impose added pressure on a
defendant to accept a plea offer, notwithstanding their
innocence. Providing criminal defendants with access to
additional information will help them make better informed
decisions regarding the full consequences of accepting guilty
pleas and not act out of frustration simply to get out of jail and
see their families.
Accordingly, the Task Force makes two recommendations to
address this problem. First, the Task Force proposes that
informational materials and videos be created that describe, in
general terms, how the criminal justice process works and what
defendants can anticipate will happen as their case proceeds
through the system. Second, the Task Force proposes that
docketing and scheduling information about individual
defendants’ cases be collected and made easily available to
defendants, regardless of whether they have been incarcerated
or released pending a resolution of their matter.
Turning first to the informational materials and videos, the
Task Force recommends that information materials about the
criminal justice system and how it works be created and made
available to every individual who is arrested or charged.46 In
addition to written materials, this could include creating a video
(similar to the video that is shown to jurors at the beginning of
46
The New York Unified Court System website already has basic
information about a range of subjects, including subjects such as Criminal
Case Basics (which includes a section on Plea Bargaining), Collateral
Consequences, Sentencing and Criminal Records & Sealing. See N.Y. State
Unified
Court
Sys.,
Criminal
Case
Basics,
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal/caseBasics.shtml (last Mar. 17,
2020). For those defendants without internet access, however, this information
is inaccessible.
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jury duty) that defendants who are being held pretrial can
view. The written materials and video would provide an
overview of the criminal justice process, including the stages of
the criminal prosecution—such as arraignment, discovery,
motion practice, trial, and appeal. They would also describe and
explain each person’s role in the criminal justice system,
including the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney, as
well as rights defendants have regarding paperwork, trial, the
People’s burden, and other information relevant to most
criminal cases. The Task Force recommends that these
materials be made available and the video be shown as soon as
possible following the accused’s arraignment, and remain
available for defendants to view at other points in time when
they would otherwise be waiting idly. The Task Force also
recommends creating companion written materials in layman’s
terms and in various language translations that defendants may
review in their cells.
With respect to scheduling and docketing information for
individual matters, the Task Force recommends that this
information be made available through kiosks at detention
centers, courts, and in other areas where individuals are
held. The kiosks could serve as information centers where
defendants can learn about the status of their own cases, find
contact information for their attorneys, and review the schedule
of upcoming matters and appearances. For defendants to learn
about the publicly available specifics of their own cases, the
kiosks could allow individuals to type in or scan their docket
number, which would pull up a list of charges against them. An
application on the interface would allow the individuals to listen
to or read the elements of the charges that the People must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, similar to pattern jury
instructions. An application on the interface would inform
individuals of the broad range of sentencing exposure and the
advisability of consulting with their attorney as to potential
outcomes,47 and another application would inform individuals
of the proceedings that have already taken place and those that
are forthcoming.48 The kiosks would have an application that
defines legal terms in understandable language, and would
47
48

Similar to New York Prosecutors Training Institute’s Crime Time.
Similar to the Criminal Records & Information Management System.

31

32

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.2

allow defendants to print out individual dockets and the contact
information for their attorneys.
1. Implementation Considerations
An obvious question is who will create and curate the
material. A potential answer is that it could be done by the
various bar associations, perhaps working with the New York
State Unified Court System.49 Another question that may arise
could pertain to the level of specificity that should be included in
the kiosk information and ways to avoid creating conflicts or
violating attorney-client privilege. To solve those issues, the
kiosks could provide a reminder about the attorney-client
privilege and could include a disclaimer that the information is
not, and not a substitute for, legal advice. And, of course, the
practical consideration of where the videos and kiosks would be
placed will require input from those most acquainted with the
process in each jurisdiction, who could provide the best insight
regarding where defendants would be able to access the
information most easily.
To conclude, individuals charged with crimes lack
appropriate access to information about their own cases and the
criminal justice system as a whole. This information gap fosters
distrust in the system and a sense of hopelessness that leads
individuals into making uninformed decisions—including
pleading guilty when they are innocent of the crimes
charged. Bridging this gap is a means to fixing that problem for
the people whose lives and liberty depend on it, and the Task
Force recommends implementing informational videos and
kiosks to achieve that goal.
D. Proposal No. 4: Adopt Recommendations of the NACDL
Report Dealing with the Trial Penalty and
Proportionality Between Pre-Trial and Post-Trial
Sentences
In July 2018, the NACDL issued a report titled “The Trial
49 See N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., supra note 46 (describing the type
of information that has already been developed by the state court system).
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Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of
Extinction and How to Save It.” 50 Based on its findings, the
NACDL Report listed ten guiding principles, as well as ten
specific recommendations for reform. These principles reflect a
broad range of beliefs, such as the values of the jury trial system,
the troublesome nature of the decline of the frequency of trials,
and the damage to society from mass incarceration—
particularly for people of color and the poor. These principles
have specific resonance with regard to plea bargaining, in
expressing that there is a problematic discrepancy between pretrial and post-trial sentences, that there are coercive elements
of plea bargaining, and that choosing to go to trial is a right
which should not be punished. 51

50
51

NACDL REPORT, supra note 15.
Id. at 11.
The trial penalty—the substantial difference between the
sentence offered prior to trial versus the sentence a
defendant receives after a trial—undermines the integrity of
the criminal justice system. Trials protect the presumption of
innocence and encourage the government to charge cases
based only on sufficient, legally-obtained evidence to satisfy
the reasonable doubt standard. The decline in the frequency
of trials impacts the quality of prosecutorial decision-making,
defense advocacy, and judicial supervision. The decline in the
frequency of trials tends to encourage longer sentences
thereby contributing to mass incarceration, including mass
incarceration of people of color and the poor. The decline in
the frequency of trials erodes the oversight function of the
jury thereby muting the voice of lay people in the criminal
justice system and also undercuts the role of appellate courts
in supervising the work of trial courts. The trial penalty
creates a coercive effect which profoundly undermines the
integrity of the plea-bargaining process. A reduction for
accepting responsibility through a guilty plea is appropriate.
The same or similar reduction should be available after trial
if an individual convicted at trial sincerely accepts
responsibility after trial regardless of whether the accused
testified at trial or not. No one should be punished for
exercising her or his rights, including seeking pre-trial
release and discovery, investigating a case, and filing and
litigation of pre-trial statutory and constitutional motions.

Id. The NACDL report also recommended the abolition of mandatory minimum
sentences, which is treated separately in this Report. See infra at Part
IV(E)(1)(a).
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An extreme difference between a sentence agreed to under
a plea versus a sentence imposed after a trial, and the discretion
prosecutors have to widen that gap by charging certain crimes
that trigger mandatory minimum sentences, creates a grave risk
that innocent people will plead guilty to avoid draconian
consequences merely for exercising their constitutional right to
trial. In circumstances in which the expected sentence after trial
is substantially more severe than the plea offer (for no reason
other than the mere fact of exercising the right to trial), a
defendant’s decision to plead guilty may have little to do with
their actual guilt; instead, the decision may be explained almost
entirely by risk-tolerance or risk-avoidance theories.52
Many of the NACDL Report’s principles and
recommendations, particularly those that aim to preserve
criminal defendants’ right to trial and reduce the use of coercive
plea tactics, are consistent with the objectives of this Report.
After extensive deliberation, the members of this Task Force
have overwhelmingly supported adopting two of the NACDL
Report’s recommendations, insofar as they relate to the New
York State criminal justice system:
Remove the Trial Penalty: The government
should not be permitted to condition plea offers on
waiver of statutory or constitutional rights
necessary for an accused person to make an
intelligent and knowing decision to plead guilty.
This includes an accused person’s decision to seek
pretrial release or discovery, investigate a case, or
litigate statutory or constitutional pre-trial
motions.
Proportionality Between Pre-Trial and Post-Trial
Sentencing: Procedures should be adopted to
ensure that the accused are not punished with
substantially longer sentences for exercising their
right to trial, or its related rights. Concretely,
post-trial sentences should not increase by more
than the following: denial of acceptance of
52

See generally Dervan & Edkins, supra note 3.
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responsibility (if appropriate); obstruction of
justice (if proved); and the development of facts
unknown before trial.53
1. Removing the Trial penalty
The widespread practice of conditioning plea offers on an
accused’s agreement not to litigate statutory and/or
constitutional issues undermines transparency, basic fairness,
and more broadly the integrity of the criminal legal system. 54 As
such, the Task Force recommends adopting the NACDL’s
recommendation of doing away with the “trial penalty,” thereby
eliminating prosecutors’ ability “to condition plea offers on
waiver of statutory or constitutional rights necessary for an
accused person to make an intelligent and knowing decision to
plead guilty,” including “an accused person’s decision to seek
pre-trial release or discovery, investigate a case, or litigate
statutory or constitutional pre-trial motions.”55 Eliminating the
trial penalty would give substance to statutory and
constitutional protections designed to protect innocence and
proportionality of punishment, as well as provide accountability
for the conduct of law enforcement. Further, eliminating the
trial penalty helps assure fair and proportionate outcomes for
every person going through the criminal justice system.
The NACDL Report provides a summary of research
showing how the trial penalty contributes to wrongful
convictions by undermining procedural protections that
elucidate when evidence is unlikely to be compelling prior to
trial.56 Because the majority of cases are resolved before pretrial motions are heard, issues pertaining to the voluntariness of
an accused’s statements to law enforcement and whether an outof-court perpetrator identification procedure is reliable, rarely
receive evidentiary hearings or meaningful judicial scrutiny.57
NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 12-13.
Id. at 28-30.
55 Id. at 59.
56 Id. at 24-30.
57
People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965) (voluntariness of
statements); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (suggestive
identification procedures).
53
54
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As a result, coerced confessions and misidentifications, as well
as other potential abuses (such as instances of police
misconduct58), are unlikely to come to light.
New York’s recent bail and discovery reforms have already
addressed some of the concerns reflected in the NACDL Report’s
recommendations.59 New York’s new discovery statute, which
took effect on January 1, 2020, mandates open-file discovery
early in the life of a criminal case. Critically, this requires
prosecutors to comply with discovery obligations prior to the
expiration of a plea offer, and expressly provides that while the
accused may waive his or her discovery rights, “a guilty plea
offer may not be conditioned on such waiver.”60 This level of
transparency, unique among the country’s criminal discovery
laws, eliminates one party’s ability to exploit information
asymmetries in plea negotiations. Moreover, for the vast
majority of people facing misdemeanors and nonviolent charges,
New York’s elimination of pretrial detention removes the
inherently coercive effect of pretrial incarceration for the large
number of people in New York’s criminal courts.
The elimination or reduction of the trial penalty would also
extend this transparency principle to the litigation of statutory
and constitutional issues. As a first step, local and state bar
associations can support broad adoption of the NACDL
recommendations and facilitate the drafting of new ethics
guidelines to regulate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Also, District attorneys are encouraged to voluntarily adopt
limits to their plea-bargaining practices.
The Supreme Court has granted prosecutors broad latitude
to leverage their informational and procedural advantages
against people accused of crimes in order to extract guilty
pleas.61 Further efforts should be undertaken to explore
legislative solutions to reform plea bargaining conditions by
examining the model of the recently passed criminal discovery
statute, and by expressly prohibiting the conditioning of plea
offers on the waiver of pre-trial motions. Legislative limitations
See NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 8.
Id. at 11-12.
60 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 245.25(1), (2) (pre-indictment guilty pleas and
all other guilty pleas, respectively).
61 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
58
59
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should be implemented only in conjunction with broad
sentencing reform so that an end to the trial penalty does not
provoke a reactionary response of elevated charges and plea
offers.
2. Proportionality Between Pre-Trial and Post-Trial
Sentencing
Because pre-trial and post-trial sentences are often vastly
disproportionate,62 it is not surprising that many defendants feel
as though they are coerced into accepting pre-trial plea offers,
regardless of the intent of the prosecutors.63 Evidence suggests
that a large enough discrepancy between expected outcomes can
lead factually innocent defendants to plead guilty.64
There can be, however, defensible reasons for a disparity
between a sentence offered in a plea and one imposed after trial.
For example, a sentencing disparity resulting from a finding of
obstruction of justice or the development of facts unknown before
trial is considered problematic by neither the NACDL nor the
members of this Task Force. The existence of obstruction of
justice is proper grounds for increasing a potential sentence
following trial because the conduct is independently punishable.
The development of facts unknown before trial is also a proper
ground for imposing a different-than-anticipated sentence as
long as it is relevant in ascertaining the conduct that is being
punished and in establishing whether the elements of an offense
have been met.
The Task Force also agrees with the NACDL Report that
demonstrated remorse on the part of a defendant who pleads
guilty is somewhat of an acceptable justification for reducing a
sentence.
However, basing sentences on a defendant’s
62 “In 2015, in most primary offense categories, the average post-trial
sentence was more than triple the average post-plea sentence. In antitrust
cases, it was more than eight times as high.” NACDL REPORT, supra note 15,
at 15.
63 See id. at 15-16; see also Jamie Fellner, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How
U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, 26 FED SENT’G
REP. 276 (2013).
64 See NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 17; see also Lucian E. Dervan,
Bargained Justice: Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and the Brady SafetyValve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 95 (2012).
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demonstrated remorse can be both risky and imprecise because
it is a subjective determination, and thus runs the risk of
artificially inflating sentence severity for those who do not
“accept responsibility” (who exercise their right to go to trial).
In practice, defendants who plead guilty are credited with
“acceptance of responsibility” even if they feel no remorse, while
genuinely remorseful defendants who exercise their
constitutional right to trial are denied the sentencing credit for
acceptance of responsibility. “Acceptance of responsibility” has
become synonymous with “pleading guilty.” This sentencing
framework can pressure defendants into pleading guilty early,
given that the system dictates that an early guilty plea
demonstrates remorse. Because of this, even factually innocent
defendants may be unwilling to assume the risk of receiving a
disproportionately harsh post-trial sentence.65 “Acceptance of
responsibility” as a sentencing factor is a component of the
framework that contributes to the disproportionality between
pre-trial and post-trial sentences, and therefore deserves the
attention of this Task Force.
The Task Force adopts the NACDL’s reasoning and
concludes that acceptance of responsibility is an appropriate
factor to mitigate a defendant’s sentence, but only when it (1)
reflects true remorse rather than an automatic result of pleabargaining; (2) is available even after a defendant has exercised
their right to trial; and (3) is not used punitively to increase a
sentence solely because the defendant has exercised their right
to trial.66 The Task Force recommends that determinations
regarding “acceptance of responsibility” be decoupled from the
acceptance of plea offers. More broadly, consistent with the
NACDL findings, the Task Force also recommends further
investigation into avenues to enact comprehensive appellate
review of the proportionality of sentences either by statute or by
rule. In addition, they recommend that further efforts be
undertaken to develop an implementation plan for this proposal
that balances the need to curb post-trial sentences that are
disproportionately severe with the need to preserve judicial
discretion in sentencing.

65
66

See NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 39-40.
Id. at 40-41.
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E. Proposal No. 5: Enhancing Judicial Discretion in
Sentencing
Traditionally, a defining feature of our criminal justice
system has been the jury trial, where a prosecutor charges a
defendant and, if the defendant is convicted at trial, a judge
imposes a sentence. Today, however, the practical reality of our
criminal justice system is that criminal trials have given way to
the resolution of criminal charges through plea agreements,
which are negotiated privately between the prosecutor and
defense counsel. Fewer than five percent of all persons formally
accused of a crime go to trial.67 More importantly, in New York,
a plea bargain typically determines the parameters of the
ultimate sentence. Thus, the role of judges in determining the
proper length of a criminal sentence has been significantly
curtailed.
Defendants, including those who have been charged with a
crime but are factually innocent,68 may be confronted with
having to defend themselves against an offense carrying a
mandatory minimum sentence. If the defendant is convicted at
trial, the judge has no discretion to downwardly depart from the
mandatory minimum sentence, even if the judge believes that
the facts warrant such a deviation. Consequently, factually
innocent defendants are confronted with a difficult risk-utility
balancing decision as to whether they should assert their right
to trial and potentially be convicted (and thereby subject
themselves to a mandatory minimum), or take a plea deal
resulting in a reduced charge that carries a lesser sentence.
The Task Force recommends that—within New York’s
current mandatory minimum framework—judges be provided
with the discretion to depart below a mandatory minimum
sentence for defendants convicted of non-violent crimes as long
NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
All defendants are presumed innocent and have a constitutional right
to a trial. Systemic and other individual factors can have the effect of
discouraging defendants from exercising this right, sometimes to
excruciatingly unjust results. This Report addresses solely the predicament of
factually innocent defendants.
67
68
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as the judge states their reasons for doing so on the record (or in
a subsequent written decision). The Task Force does not
advocate for any specific changes in the Federal sentencing
guidelines or mandatory minimum statutes. The Task Force
believes that any such reforms would be extremely difficult to
accomplish outside of federal legislation that would affect the
entire country and not just the state of New York and, in any
event, the restructuring of the entire federal criminal justice
system is well beyond the mandate of this Task Force.
1. Mandatory Minimums Sentences
A Brief History of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing
In response to rising crime rates and drug usage during the
1970s and ‘80s, Congress and several states began passing
mandatory minimum sentences for, inter alia, drug offenses,
gun offenses, and sex offenses.69 For example, before the
enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 by the Obama
Administration, possessing five grams of crack cocaine carried a
five year mandatory minimum sentence.70
Similarly the
“Rockefeller Laws,” which were passed in New York in 1973,
prescribed harsh mandatory minimums for a slew of drug
offenses,71 such as the possession of four ounces of marijuana,
which even without an intent to distribute carried a fifteen-year
mandatory minimum sentence.72 By the early 2000s, it had
become clear that these draconian laws had led to unduly harsh
sentences, especially in poor communities and among people of
color.73 Since then, New York has undergone the process of
chipping away at this mandatory minimum framework—both in
terms of sentence length and offenses carrying mandatory

69 Frederick P. Hafetz, The “Virtual Extinction” of Criminal Trials: A
Lawyer’s View from the Well of the Court, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 248 (2019).
70 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: IMPACT OF THE FAIR
SENTENCING ACT OF 2010, at 30 (2015).
71 Madison Gray, A Brief History of New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws,
TIME
(Apr.
2,
2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888864,00.html.
72 Rakoff, supra note 2, at 2-3.
73 Gray, supra note 71.
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minimum sentences.74
Nevertheless, New York still has
numerous offenses75 that carry a mandatory minimum sentence
from which a judge has no discretion to deviate except in very
limited circumstances.
2. Pros & Cons of Mandatory Minimum Sentences
The Task Force has considered various arguments as to the
utility and shortcomings of mandatory minimum statutes.
Pros:
Mandatory minimums protect the public for a
prescribed amount of time from behavior the
legislature has deemed a threat to the public
welfare.76
Mandatory minimums are a deterrence
mechanism against recidivism by an individual
offender, or by other would-be offenders.77
Mandatory minimums might tend to eliminate or
reduce sentencing disparities among defendants
convicted of the same crime and among similarly
situated defendants, particularly as it affects
minorities.78
Cons:
Mandatory minimum sentences may exacerbate
the phenomenon of mass incarceration by

Id.
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.04 (McKinney 2019) (proscribing
minimum sentences for Class A drug felony offenses); id. § 60.05 (proscribing
minimum sentences for Class C non-violent felony offenses); id. § 130.95
(proscribing minimum sentences for non-drug offense predicate felons).
76 See KEVIN EMAS, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES: HANDCUFFING THE
PRISONER
OR
THE
JUDGE?
31
(2014),
http://amjudges.org/conferences/2014Annual/ConferenceMaterials/ZC-EmasMandatory-Minimum-Sentences-Written-Materials-8-14.pdf.
77 Id.
78 Id.
74
75
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uniformly lengthening the sentences of convicted
persons.79
There is insufficient evidence that—especially in
narcotics cases—mandatory minimums lead to a
reduced likelihood of recidivism.80
Longer sentences increase costs of monitoring and
providing for prisoners.
Mandatory minimum offenses only take into
account the specific elements of the offense and do
not consider the history and circumstances of the
defendant.81
Judges have no discretion to deviate from the
minimum—even when there are mitigating
factors that might justify a deviation, such as the
ability to weigh the nature and circumstances of
the crime, as well as the individual who
committed them, including the risk of reoffending,
the defendant’s prior record, and any substance
abuse or mental health issues.82
The Task Force recommends that the New York legislature
enact provisions which would permit judges—in non-violent
felony cases83 (as defined by New York’s Penal Law)—to deviate

79 See James Cullen, Sentencing Laws and How They Contribute to Mass
Incarceration,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUST.
(Oct.
5,
2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/sentencing-laws-and-how-theycontribute-mass-incarceration-0.
80 See EMAS, supra note 76.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 The Task Force did not achieve consensus as to whether a judge should
also have the discretion to deviate from a mandatory minimum for persons
convicted of violent felonies. We recommend that additional research be
conducted by subsequent task forces as to the feasibility and advisability of
providing judges with this discretion. The Task Force also recommends
conducting empirical studies to examine the utility of eliminating (certain or
all) mandatory minimum sentences under New York’s Penal Law.
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from a conviction carrying a mandatory minimum, provided that
the judge states his or her reasons for doing so on the record, or
in a subsequent written opinion. The Task Force further
recommends the New York Legislature adopt guidelines for
judges to consider when departing from a mandatory minimum.
These guidelines could mirror, for example, many of the factors
federal judges are required to consult when sentencing a
defendant.84 In determining whether a “sentence is sufficient,
but not greater than necessary,”85 federal judges are required to
consult a list of factors, including:
the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant;86
and
the need for the sentence imposed:
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect of the law, and to provide just punishment
for the offense;87
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;88
to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant;89
to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective
manner.90
Under the Task Force’s proposal, prosecutors would have
the right to appeal any sentence lower than the mandatory
minimum.
Providing judges with discretion to deviate from mandatory
minimum sentences alleviates the arguably coercive effect that
mandatory minimums play in plea bargaining. Restoring the
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).
Id.
Id. § 3553(a)(1).
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2018).
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judicial autonomy judges once enjoyed—and what was
traditionally within their purview—would make a defendant’s
choice to assert their right to a trial less onerous and less risky.
This, in turn, would reduce the likelihood that an innocent
person would choose to plead guilty to a lesser charge in order to
escape a mandatory minimum sentence if convicted at trial.
Sentencing is one of the most difficult and nuanced tasks a
judge must perform. It requires the judge to balance society’s
legitimate concerns—public safety, deterrence, promoting
respect for the law and reflecting the seriousness of the offense—
while also taking into account possible mitigating factors such
as the history and characteristics of the defendant. Unlike the
legislatures who set mandatory minimums—which focus solely
on the offense—the sentencing judge hears the underlying facts
of the case, hears the arguments of both the prosecutor and
defense counsel, and receives reports from probation offices
containing extensive background information about the
defendant. Given the wealth of information in their hands, the
Task Force believes judges should be allowed to use their
practical judgment to arrive at an appropriate sentence.
F. Proposal No. 6: Reducing the Volume and Impact of
Low-Level Offenses in the Criminal Justice System
The perceived impediments to pleading guilty are lessened
if penalties such as those that affect low-level offenses are
relatively minor. Even if an innocent defendant understands the
consequences of a guilty plea, they might decide to plead if the
sanctions are relatively minor. Low-level offenses are the
perfect example of when an innocent person might say “it is
easier to just plead guilty and pay the fine.” Of course, the
collateral consequences of such a plea may extend to well beyond
paying a fine, including significantly diminishing an individual’s
quality of life.
For an overwhelming majority of defendants, involvement
with the criminal justice system stems from arrests and
prosecutions for minor offenses.
In 2018, over 270,000
misdemeanor arrests were made in New York State (nearly half
of these within New York City), representing two-thirds of all
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arrests that year.91 A substantial proportion of such arrests are
for victimless offenses commonly associated with poverty,
homelessness, addiction, and mental illness.
Of the
misdemeanor arrests made in New York City in 2016, 27,642
(18%) were classified as a “theft of services” charge,92 which is
primarily fare-beating on public transit.93 Additionally, 21,457
(14%) were made for marijuana charges,94 15,458 (10%) for other
drug charges, 7543 (5%) for trespassing,95 and 2194 (1.5%) for
prostitution.96
91
Adult Arrests: 2009 - 2018, N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVS.,
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/nys.pdf (last visited
Mar. 18, 2020).
92 PREETI CHAUHAN ET AL., JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRENDS
IN ARRESTS FOR MISDEMEANOR CHARGES IN NEW YORK CITY, 1993-2016, at 14344
(2018),
http://misdemeanorjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/2018_01_24_MJP.Charges.FINAL_.pdf.
93 Id. at 137 (stating that 95.1% of “Theft of Services” arrests from 19932016 were for violations of section 165.15(3) of the New York Penal Law).
94
The state legislature recently passed legislation that would treat
possession of small quantities of marijuana as a violation, and the New York
City Police Department (“NYPD”) has announced of a policy of issuing Desk
Appearance Tickets rather than making arrests in most such cases. See City
of N.Y., Mayor De Blasio, Commissioner O’Neill Unveil New Policy to Reduce
Unnecessary
Marijuana
Arrests,
NYC
(June
19,
2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr0619/
mayor-de-blasio-commissioner-o-neill-new-policy-reduce-unnecessarymarijuana-arrests; Jesse McKinley & Vivian Wang, Marijuana
Decriminalization is Expanded in N.Y., but Full Legalization Fails, N.Y. TIMES
(June 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/nyregion/marijuanalaws-ny.html. Despite this development, it nonetheless remains the case that
a significant number of individuals will be convicted of violations for marijuana
possession in New York City and other parts of the state.
95 Defense attorneys in New York City have argued that a substantial
proportion of trespassing charges are in fact brought against defendants who
are lawfully present in apartment buildings. See, e.g., M. Chris Fabricant,
Rousting
the
Cops,
VILLAGE
VOICE
(Oct.
30,
2007),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2007/10/30/rousting-the-cops/ (Bronx public
defender reporting that he has “had a disgraceful number of innocent clients,
many of whom plead guilty to a trespassing charge”); Joseph Goldstein,
Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-resistance-toprosecuting-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html. The then-chief of arraignments for
the Bronx District Attorney’s Office “had received numerous complaints from
defense lawyers who claimed that many of the people arrested were not
trespassers” and upon investigation found that “in many (but not all) of the
cases the defendants arrested were either legitimate tenants or invited
guests.” Id.
96 CHAUHAN ET AL., supra note 92.
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In New York City, most misdemeanor arrests do not result
in convictions. In 2018, sixty-three percent of dispositions for
such arrests were dismissals of some form.97 The sentence for a
misdemeanor or violation conviction is generally less than that
for a felony, but the collateral consequences can be severe. A
criminal conviction may cause an individual to be denied
employment or housing, or even to be legally prohibited from
working in certain professions.98 For example, people convicted
of misdemeanors are ineligible for public housing provided by
the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) for periods of
three or four years.99 A drug offense conviction, regardless of its
severity, can cause even a lawfully present noncitizen to be
deported, as can offenses treated under federal immigration law
as “crimes involving moral turpitude,” which include minor
offenses such as turnstile jumping, shoplifting, and indecent
exposure.100
The impact of these collateral consequences
disproportionately fall upon minority communities. In New
York City, the misdemeanor arrest rate for the black population
is five and a half times as high as that of the white population,
and for the Hispanic population the arrest rate is three times as
high.101

1. Impact on Plea Bargaining and Wrongful Convictions

97 New York City Adult Arrests Disposed, N.Y. ST. DIVISION C RIM. JUST.
SERVS., https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nyc.pdf (last
visited Mar. 18, 2020).
98
See, e.g., Jenny M. Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277,
297-303 (2011); see also Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender
Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 30 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 589-90 (2005).
99 NYC Hous. Auth., Tenant Selection and Assignment Plan, NYC 23
(Sept.
23,
2016),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/TSAPlan.pdf.
100
Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758-59 (2013).
101 MEREDITH PATTEN ET AL., TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS IN NEW
YORK, 1980 TO 2017, at 77 (2018), http://misdemeanorjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/FINAL.pdf.
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The various factors that lead criminal defendants to forsake
trial and plead guilty are exacerbated in the context of
adjudicating minor offenses. Defendants charged with minor
offenses face strong incentives to plead guilty, despite whether
or not they are factually guilty. This is owed to the “process
costs” of proceeding to trial: attending pretrial court
appearances, enduring pretrial detention, and paying legal fees
if counsel is retained.102 Even if the risk of a conviction and the
“trial penalty” are taken into account, such costs may outweigh
the costs of pleading guilty, and may be more readily apparent
and compelling than the long-term, often unforeseen collateral
consequences of conviction.
In light of these considerations, it is unsurprising that
virtually all misdemeanor defendants choose to forego trial. Of
the 259,016 cases that reached a disposition in New York City
Criminal Court in 2017, 120,707 (46.6%) were resolved by a
guilty plea, 111,679 (43.12%) were dismissed or adjudicated in
contemplation of dismissal (“ACD”), and only 646 (0.25%)
terminated by a trial verdict.103 A review of exonerations
subsequent to misdemeanor convictions found that almost
eighty percent were in cases where the defendant pled guilty, in
contrast to the sixteen percent of felony exoneration cases where
the defendant pled guilty.104 While it is impossible to know how
many more innocent individuals have been convicted of minor
offenses, it is most likely a substantial number; for most
defendants in such cases face overwhelming incentives to plead
guilty.
In order to reduce the number of innocent people who plead
guilty, the Task Force recommends that there should be a
reduction in the volume and impact of low-level offenses in the
criminal justice system. The Task Force discussed multiple
ways of achieving this goal and presents below four examples of
ways in which the volume and impact of low-level offenses can
be reduced throughout the New York State criminal justice
See Bowers, supra note 10, at 1132-39.
TAMIKO AMAKER & JUSTIN A. BARRY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF
NYC
CRIMINAL
COURT,
2017
ANNUAL
REPORT
17
(2018),
https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFs/COURTS/nyc/criminal/2017-AnnualReport.pdf.
104 Samuel R. Gross, Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 999, 1008 (2018).
102
103

47

48

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.2

system.
2. Suggested Solutions
Decriminalize Low-Level Offenses105
The simplest way to reduce the number of low-level cases in
criminal court and low-level charges on criminal complaints is
to remove at least some of those low-level criminal charges from
the New York State and New York City criminal codes.
Reducing the number of misdemeanor cases and charges would
have a direct effect on the ability of the accused to adjudicate
their cases and demonstrate their innocence. Moreover, the
imposition of civil fines as a substitute for incarceration may
have the unintended effect of saddling an individual with
debt.106
Some examples of promising legislative decriminalization
and legalization efforts include:
In 2019, New York State repealed the gravity
knife provision from the misdemeanor of strict
liability possession of a weapon under sections
265.01(1) and 265.00(5) of the Penal Law.107 The
gravity knife possession crime had been used to
prosecute tens of thousands of New Yorkers for
both misdemeanors and felonies, often for
possessing knives used for work. In 2018, more
than eighty-five percent of arrests for gravity
knife possession in NYC were of Black or Latino
men or women.108
105 Although the Task Force recommends decriminalizing a number of
low-level offenses, the Task Force recognizes that certain low-level offenses
may still require a remedy outside of the criminal justice system.
106 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 1055, 1093 (2015).
107 Jesse McKinley, The “Gravity Knife” Led to Thousands of Questionable
Arrests.
Now
It’s
Legal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
31,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/nyregion/ny-gravity-knife-law.html;
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.00, 265.01 (McKinney 2019).
108 See JULIE CICCOLINI, LEGAL A ID SOC’Y, GRAVITY KNIFE ARRESTS IN NEW
YORK CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 2018 – JUNE 29, 2018, at 2 (2018),
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In 2019, Illinois became the eleventh state to
legalize the possession of marijuana.109 The
Illinois law legalizes recreational possession and
sale of marijuana by adults, and provides for the
pardon and automatic expungement of previous
low-level convictions for marijuana. This law
stands in contrast to the weaker 2019 New York
law, which partially decriminalized but did not
legalize marijuana possession. 110
Decline to Prosecute Low-Level Offenses
The charging decision is a significant opportunity for a
prosecutor to exercise discretion. Charging decisions should
reflect an honest and informed analysis of the sufficiency of the
evidence.111 Yet even when there may be a justifiable basis for
charging, a prosecutor still has wide discretion to decline to do
so.112
The decision not to charge has several other salutary
efficiency and economic benefits; such as reducing criminal court
cases, allowing prosecutors to devote resources to serious crimes,
and avoiding multiple (and often financially and psychologically
damaging) court appearances by defendants. Importantly, the
upfront decision to decline prosecution eliminates any incentive
for a defendant to plead guilty.
Several prosecutors around the country, including several
District Attorneys in New York City, are reviewing and
establishing policies of declining to prosecute specific crimes,
specific types of crime (such as non-violent conduct or quality of
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59578aade110eba6434f4b72/t/5c8130d8
e5e5f04b9a2dd4fa/1551970520709/gravity_knife_analysis_press.pdf.
109
Meghan Keneally, Illinois Becomes the 11th State to Legalize
Marijuana, ABC NEWS (June 25, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/US/illinois-set11th-state-legalize-marijuana/story?id=63929963.
110
See Act of July 29, 2019, ch. 131, 2019 N.Y. S.B. 6579 (partially
decriminalizing marijuana and expunging convictions for low-level marijuana
offenses).
111 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 34.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
112 See id.
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life crimes), or specific levels of criminal charges.113 These
practices not only divert low-level and non-violent crimes out of
the court system, but also acknowledge that some arrests reflect
racial disparities and conduct connected to poverty. The Task
Force applauds the efforts of several of the New York City
District Attorney’s Offices that have taken the initiative to
decline to prosecute certain types of low-level non-violent
conduct.114 The Task Force recommends that all prosecutors
explore ways to expand the use of discretion to decline
prosecution and enact policies that make the terms of this
discretion clear to all assistant prosecutors.
Diversion without Charging or Guilty Pleas
Diversion is generally understood to mean alternatives to
incarceration where social services replace traditional
punishment when the root cause of the criminal activity might
be substance abuse, mental health problems, or youth. Today,
many courts have robust post-charging diversion programs
supported by prosecutors’ offices. Most focus on minor crimes,
but in some instances, some diversion programs can be triggered
by even more serious criminal charges. New York’s Center for
Court Innovation sponsors and implements many diversion
alternatives.115 The Center for Court Innovation also tracks
initiatives which could provide additional models in New
York.116
The Task Force is heartened by prosecutors’ recognition
that diversion can be an effective alternative to incarceration.
We suggest that law enforcement and prosecutors consider the
circumstances that would justify the implementation of
diversion prior to charging. For example, the Brooklyn District
113
See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: A REPORT BY THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE 71, 73, 93 (Erik Luna ed.,
2017); see GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 14-17.
114 See GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 12.
115
See
Programs,
CTR.
FOR
COURT
INNOVATION,
http://www.courtinnovation.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
116 See, e.g., MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, NIJ’S
MULTISITE EVALUATION OF PROSECUTOR-LED DIVERSION PROGRAMS (2018),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2017/Pret
rial_Diversion_Overview_ProvRel.pdf.
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Attorney has plans to offer pre-plea alternatives for all drug
possession charges.117 Another example is the Center for Court
Innovation’s Project Reset Program,118 which provides
participants the possibility to avoid court and a criminal record
by completing community-based programming. Project Reset
now operates in Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx.
Court-based diversion programs should not require a guilty
plea as a condition for entering a program and avoiding
incarceration, except perhaps in the most serious cases. First, a
defendant might be induced to plead guilty regardless of actual
guilt simply to gain admission to the diversion program rather
than face a more severe punishment. Second, even if the
defendant succeeds in meeting all of the conditions of the
program, a guilty plea has far-reaching collateral consequences.
Instead, diversion programs could, when possible, take the lead
and address the immediate needs of the individual. For
example, the programs could provide subway fares, assist in
obtaining benefits, and refer to social services without requiring
the defendant to repeatedly return to court. Compliance with
the conditions of diversion could be monitored with written
submissions to the court.
Expungement & Declining to Consider Past Convictions
Many New Yorkers accused of crimes come into criminal
court at an extreme disadvantage in the plea-bargaining
process. Indeed, studies demonstrate that it is often past
convictions that dictate how a prosecutor will treat a case in New
York City Criminal Court, even more than the facts of the case
itself, especially in misdemeanor cases.119 This disadvantage
can be cured through (i) legislative action to facilitate
expungements; (ii) executive action through mass pardons; and
(iii) district attorney policies to seek expungements and to
See GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 12.
See
Project
Reset,
CTR.
FOR
COURT
INNOVATION,
https://www.courtinnovation.org/programs/project-reset (last visited Mar. 18,
2020).
119
See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSSMAN, MISDEMEANORLAND (2018)
(conducting a long-term empirical study of the use of criminal records in
misdemeanor cases in New York City).
117
118
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decline to consider past convictions in plea bargaining decisions.
Legislative action: The New York State
legislature and the New York City Council can
aim to pass laws that facilitate, and where
possible automate, expungements of past
convictions, including for serious felonies after a
certain period of time.
Executive clemency: The Governor of New York
can use his or her clemency powers to engage in
mass pardons of low-level convictions and older
felony convictions.
Prosecutorial discretion to seek expungements
and not consider past convictions: District
Attorneys in New York City should be on the
frontlines of efforts to ensure that past convictions
do not interfere with plea bargaining. They can
do so in at least two ways. First, District
Attorneys can facilitate the expungement of past
convictions using existing laws. Second, they can
enact policies under which they decline to
consider past low-level offenses and related
warrants during bail proceedings and pleabargaining negotiations. Past low-level offenses
would not be considered if such offenses are no
longer crimes, would no longer be prosecuted
today, or are related to poverty, addiction, or
racialized policing.120
V. CONCLUSION
From the inception of our Republic, a fair trial has been the
guiding principle of our criminal justice system. In the past 200
years, the basic way people are convicted of a crime has
120 For more on the connections between prosecutors and expungements,
see Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters: Prosecutorial Discretion and
Expungement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2825 (2018).
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substantially changed. Plea agreements predominate, while the
trial by jury has become a decreasingly viable “right.” One of the
unplanned effects of the ubiquity of plea bargaining has been
that unacceptable numbers of innocent people plead guilty and
are criminally punished. The proposals set forth in this Report
should not be particularly controversial. The Task Force
considered over 100 proposals. Feasibility and impact were our
guiding principles. The overwhelming consensus of the Task
Force was that these six proposals are achievable and corrective.
The Task Force believes that the recommendations put
forward in this Report will have a direct impact on the dignity
and self-respect of individuals going through the criminal justice
system, and will help to prevent the tragic, unjust decision
innocent people make when they plead guilty to a crime they did
not commit. Moreover, these recommendations will assure the
integrity of the criminal justice process, which is itself a goal of
paramount importance during a time of public cynicism as well
as an eroding confidence in lawyers and the courts. A system
that tolerates, and even encourages, incorrect and unfair results
demeans all of those who participate in it. This Report outlines
what the Task Force believes are reasonable reforms. The time
to implement them is now.
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